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RUTH BADER GINSBURG, WISE LEGAL GIANT
Thomas A. Schweitzer*
APPOINTMENT TO THE SUPREME COURT
On July 20, 1993, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appeared
before the Senate Judiciary Committee and its chairman, Senator
Joseph R. Biden of Delaware, for hearings on her nomination by
President William J. Clinton to the Supreme Court of the United
States.1 This was the first Supreme Court nomination by a
Democratic president since Lyndon Johnson appointed Thurgood
Marshall in 1967. It was to replace retiring Justice Byron White, and
Clinton told aides he wanted to hit a “home run.”2 Ginsburg’s
nomination came at an awkward moment for President Clinton, who
had made three unsuccessful nominations of women to Justice
Department posts during his first year in office. 3

* Professor Emeritus, Touro Law School, 1984-2020; A.B. History Honors cum
laude College of the Holy Cross, 1966; M.A., Ph.D. History, University of
Wisconsin, 1971; J.D. Yale Law School, 1977.
1
JANE SHERRON DE HART, RUTH BADER GINSBURG: A LIFE 319 (Vintage Books
ed. 2020) (2018). This remarkably comprehensive, legally sophisticated and
readable work will no doubt rank as the definitive biography of the justice for the
foreseeable future. The author, a professor emerita of history at the University of
California, Santa Barbara, devoted over fifteen years to researching and writing it
and was granted numerous interviews by Ginsburg and many of her friends and
family members.
2
Id. at 302.
3
The abortive nominations were of Lani Guinier as Assistant Attorney-General and
Kimba Wood and Zoe Baird as Attorneys-General. Jill Lepore, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s Unlikely Path to the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/08/ruth-bader-ginsburgs-unlikelypath-to-the-supreme-court. Clinton finally succeeded with his nomination of
Attorney General Janet Reno, who urged him to appoint a woman to the Supreme
Court. DE HART, supra note 1, at 316.
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Justice White was known to be thinking of retirement at the
time of Clinton’s election, but this Kennedy nominee presumably
wanted his successor to be appointed by a Democratic president. 4
After Clinton’s election, White tendered his resignation on March 19,
1993.5 Clinton considered appointing a woman as White’s successor
but initially demurred when Ginsburg was proposed to him because
he had been told “The women are against her.”6 The women’s
groups’ lack of enthusiasm for her was due in part to the critique of
Roe v. Wade7 that she had articulated in her 1993 Madison Lecture. 8
On the fractious D.C. Circuit Court, Ginsburg had taken a
middle-of-the-road stance.9 In November 1991, The American
Lawyer named her one of the nation’s leading centrist judges. As her
friend Professor Jeffrey Rosen subsequently described her, she was
considered “a paragon of judicial restraint.” 10 When her candidacy
was suggested, White House staffer Joel Klein distilled exhaustive
research on Ginsburg into a nine-page single-spaced personal and
legal profile. The Klein memo concluded that Ginsburg was “an
accomplished advocate, respected scholar and eminent jurist, highly
esteemed for her forceful mind and dedication to the law.” 11 He
added that her court challenges in the 1970s “left a lasting imprint on
legal doctrine and American society. It may be a reflection of how
far we have come that these triumphs seem taken for granted
today.”12 Klein’s memo said she was not a judicial activist and said
4

DE HART, supra note 1, at 309.
Id. at 303.
6
Lepore, supra note 3.
7
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8
DE HART, supra note 1, at 305-06; see infra p. 552 on the Madison Lecture.
9
Ginsburg “position[ed] herself to the right of Wald, Mikva, and Edwards.” DE
HART, supra note 1, at 297. Her friendship with Antonin Scalia, despite their
diametrically opposed legal views, was legendary. Perhaps even more surprising to
her liberal clerks was that she became very friendly with Judge Robert Bork; the
campaign led by Senator Ted Kennedy to derail Reagan’s nomination of Bork
because of his extremist views was the first major partisan battle in the Senate on
Supreme Court nominations. Moreover, liberals were disappointed when she voted
with Bork, Scalia, and other conservatives against navy petty officer James
Dronenburg’s challenge to his dismissal by the Navy without back pay because his
consensual homosexual conduct was deemed not to be protected by the right to
privacy. Id. at 297.
10
DE HART, supra note 1, at 307 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: The
New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N. Y. TIMES, October 5, 1997, at SM 60).
11
Id. at 305.
12
Id. at 305-06.
5
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that her approach to cases was “fundamentally pragmatic, displaying
little enthusiasm for rigid, abstract rules as theories.” 13 DeHart
explains that this approach means “someone who tended to resolve
cases on narrow procedural grounds, preferring small incremental
steps to bold assertions of judicial power in order to preserve the
legitimacy of the outcome.”14 DeHart adds:
Judicial minimalism, Clinton knew, was then
considered to be the best defensive strategy at the time
for putting a brake on the conservative activists on the
Court who were vigorously striking down progressive
legislation. Further, minimalism encouraged justices
to focus on the particularities of the case at hand rather
than make sweeping announcements that get too far
ahead of elected branches of government and the
public in making law.15
Ginsburg was sixty years old, not the ideal nominee’s age for
partisan liberals who wanted to nominate a justice who would be
expected to stay on the Court for three or more decades.
Conservative Republican Senator Orrin Hatch, who was friendly with
a law partner of Martin Ginsburg (Ruth’s husband), stated that
Ginsburg would be an acceptable nominee. However, Clinton, who
had been elected with only 43% of the vote, appreciated the
importance of appealing to Republicans. White House staffer Joel
Klein said Ginsburg would be a consensus builder and “would be
perceived in many quarters as a departure from the use of ideology as
a primary consideration in Supreme Court nominees.” 16 Her
candidacy was given a strong endorsement by her former Harvard
professor and former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, who eight
years earlier, in a speech to the NAACP, had identified her, Charles
Houston, and Thurgood Marshall as three major advocates who had
contributed to changing civil rights law.17 Columbia University
President Michael Sovern also strongly endorsed her candidacy; his
note to Senator Moynihan said “Pat, she‘s the real thing.”18
13

Id. at 305.
Id. at 307.
15
Id. at 307-08.
16
Id. at 306.
17
Id.
18
Id.
14
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Duly impressed by these enthusiastic accolades by prominent
jurists and his own staffer, Yale Law School graduate Bill Clinton
summoned Ginsburg to meet with him on June 12. While she lacked
time to prepare and was chagrined to appear in casual clothing after
this sudden request, Ginsburg made a superb impression on Clinton
when he interviewed her.
Clinton declared that he was
“tremendously impressed” by her life story and legal expertise, as
someone who viewed government in terms of the way it impacted
people’s lives.19 According to her biographer, Clinton concluded that
she was a principled individual with sterling credentials, a brilliant
mind and empathy for ordinary folk. He decided to nominate her on
the spot, and most women’s groups rallied to her support.20
Ginsburg’s husband, prominent tax lawyer Martin Ginsburg,
had actively promoted her nomination, and New York Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan had enthusiastically lobbied for her among his
Senate colleagues. 21 She had received the highest possible rating
from the American Bar Association, and there appeared to be no
organized public opposition to her nomination. 22
At the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, Committee
Chairman Biden was effusively cordial to Ginsburg. According to
historian Jill Lepore, this was because he was “[k]een to do penance
for the debacle of the Clarence Thomas hearings, just two years
before – the year before the Year of the Woman – when an all-male
committee, chaired by Biden, failed to credit what Anita Hill had to
say about George H. W. Bush’s Supreme Court nominee.” 23
Ginsburg was well-prepared for the July 20th Hearing; she had
studied the entire history of Supreme Court nominations and was
determined not to reveal any views she might hold on legal issues
that might come before the Court. She emphasized at the outset that

19

Id. at 307.
Id.
21
White House staffers Ron Klain and Joel Klein lobbied for her on the “Hill,” and
Judiciary Committee Counsel Elena Kagan carefully monitored the proceedings.
Id. at 318, 321.
22
Id. at 290. Many prominent law professors and attorneys wrote letters in support
of Ginsburg’s nomination, including Janet Benshoof, the founding director of the
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, who was a Mac Arthur fellow and one of
The National Law Journal’s “100 Most Influential Lawyers in America.” Id. at
315.
23
Lepore, supra note 3.
20
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she was there “to be judged as a judge, not as an advocate.” 24 Biden
asked her how she could reconcile two positions she had taken on
women’s rights issues. On the one hand, in her path-breaking
litigation in the 1970s, she had pressed the Supreme Court to make
gender a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. In contrast, at the
New York University Madison Lecture several months before the
committee hearing, she had taken a more moderate stance. 25 In her
NYU address, she stated that judges should be “moderate and
restrained” concerning rights not listed in the Constitution and should
not get ahead of “the political process.”26
Judge Ginsburg resisted responding to this question by Biden.
When he pressed her, however, she gave a good rationale for her
reticence:
We cherish living in a democracy, and we also know
that this Constitution did not create a tricameral
system. Judges must be mindful of what their place is
in this system and must always remember that we live
in a democracy that can be destroyed if judges take it
upon themselves to rule as Platonic guardians. 27
When Biden pressed her further, Ginsburg clammed up and
repeatedly refused to answer questions “that may well be before the
24

DE HART, supra note 1, at 319-20. She promised to follow the guidance of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who counseled that “[O]ne of the most sacred
duties of a judge is not to read [her]convictions into [the Constitution].” Id. at 320.
25
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185
(1992). This article is an adaptation for publication of the initial Madison Lecture
on Constitutional Law which Judge Ginsburg delivered at N.Y.U. on March 9,
1993. The article’s preface referred to the Roe v. Wade decision as follows: “she
contrasts the Supreme Court’s sweeping opinion in Roe v. Wade with the Court’s
more restrained approach in contemporaneous cases involving explicitly genderbased discrimination . . .” Id. at 1185. See also Ian Shapiro, Still Speaking in a
Judicial Voice: Ruth Bader Ginsburg Two Decades Later, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE
257, 258 (2013).
26
Lepore, supra note 3.
27
Id. Here, she invoked the traditional principle that since the Supreme Court is
neither a third house of Congress with power to legislate nor the body of powerful
elders who Plato in The Republic contemplated would rule society, justices should
limit themselves to adjudicating cases and should avoid trying to read their
personal opinions into laws.
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Court again . . .”28 Eventually, Senator William Cohen of Maine
exclaimed in frustration: “there is some suspicion in some circles . . .
that you are basically a political activist who’s been hiding in the
restrictive robes of an appellate judge, and that those restrictions will
be cast aside when you don a much larger garment.” 29
Despite these pressures, Ginsburg stuck to her guns. She won
the unanimous support of the Judiciary Committee. Shortly
afterward, with Senator Moynihan’s “diligent and vigorous
sponsorship,”30 the Senate endorsed her candidacy by a vote of
ninety-six to three.
Ginsburg’s appointment would make history since she would
be the second female justice, and she had an outstanding record of
achievement in women’s rights law. Moreover, her overwhelming
vote in the Senate seems hard to believe by twenty-first century
standards. Nevertheless, Judge Ginsburg’s Supreme Court candidacy
was not greeted with unanimous acclaim by all proponents of
women’s rights when her nomination was first suggested. This was
largely due to her position on Roe v. Wade, which struck down
prohibitions of abortion in forty-six states. As noted above, despite
her strong support for abortion rights, Ginsburg did not concur with
the legal basis of that opinion, a stance which she never repudiated.
Her legal record on this matter, and the philosophy which it
embodies, is the subject of this note.31
EARLY BIOGRAPHY
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a tiny bird-like creature barely
five feet tall, was universally and justly regarded as a legal giant
when she died on September 18, 2020. She was the unusual justice
who made her greatest impact as an attorney before becoming a
federal judge. She earned this reputation by her successful advocacy
28

DE HART, supra note 1, at 321.
Id. Elena Kagan, who served as counsel to the Judiciary Committee, was
impressed by Ginsburg’s “preternaturally controlled testimony”: when she chose to
sidestep a question, she would say that the question might come before the Court
again, and “it would be inappropriate for me to say anything more.” Id.
30
Id.
31
The fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe
v. Bolton will occur in January 2023, and it will be interesting to see if any law
schools observe the anniversary with symposia. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973).
29
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in support of women’s rights and in opposition to entrenched gender
stereotypes in the law during the 1970s. Since the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, not a single Supreme Court decision
had held that the equal protection clause was violated by
discrimination against women. Her four landmark cases permanently
changed this.32 As a result, it was often noted that her cases leading
to the advancement of women’s legal rights resembled Thurgood
Marshall’s litigation success in advancing the civil rights of African
Americans (Thurgood Marshall was the first African American
Justice). Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold may have been
the first person to acknowledge this when he dubbed her “the
Thurgood Marshall of gender equality law.” 33
Justice Ginsburg’s life and career coincided with the great
expansion of women’s presence and accomplishment in law,
medicine, and other professions. Female students comprise more
than half of law school enrollments at present, an astonishing figure
when it is contrasted with their near-total absence when the future
justice began her career more than six decades ago. For instance,
Ginsburg was one of nine female students in a Harvard Law School
entering class of five hundred fifty-two.34 Ginsburg’s mother Celia, a
very intelligent, strong woman, had had to subordinate her own
ambitions in life to the interests of her brother Sol. Conforming to
the expectations of her working-class parents, Celia had gone to work
to support herself and to help enable Sol to attend Cornell
University.35
Ruth Bader, who was born in Brooklyn in 1933, faced and
overcame major challenges in life. Her sister Marilyn died of spinal
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.
1972); Frontiero v. Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973); and Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
33
Lepore, supra note 3.
34
DE HART, supra note 1, at 54. Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold often embarrassed
entering female students by asking why they should take a place that belonged to a
male who would be expected to support a family. Some professors held a “ladies’
day” once a semester, the only time female students were called upon.
35
“At that time, Jewish families commonly sacrificed the futures of their daughters
to ensure that a son might attend a prestigious school and enter a high-status
profession as his birthright in the New World, benefitting other members of the
family with his upward mobility.” Id. at 8. Celia also saved a large sum of money
for Ruth’s education which she ultimately did not need because she received
scholarships. Ruth gave most of the money to help her father, a struggling
businessman. Id. at 28.
32
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meningitis at age six when Ruth was two, and her parents’ deep grief
overshadowed her childhood. 36 Her mother died when she was
seventeen, causing her to miss her high school graduation two days
later. Early in their marriage, her husband Martin contracted
testicular cancer as a Harvard law student, and she had to care for
him and their young daughter. Ginsburg’s husband eventually died
of cancer, and she herself contracted colon cancer and pancreatic
cancer.37
Ruth met “Marty,” her future husband, as a young freshman at
Cornell College. They fell in love and married after her graduation at
the age of twenty-one; their daughter Jane was born in 1955, a year
later. Then Marty was drafted, and they moved to Fort Sill,
Oklahoma for two years. Marty later described this unusually placid
period as a stroke of good fortune, where they could get to know one
another far from school and career pressure. By all accounts, he was
a wonderful spouse, and his prosperous parents fully supported Ruth
and encouraged her to pursue law school despite having an infant
daughter.
The young couple then returned to Harvard, where Marty
began law school and she followed him a year later. In 1957, another
tragedy struck: Marty contracted a life-threatening case of cancer.
Fortunately, after two draconian operations and daily radiation
treatments, he survived and recovered. During this time, Ruth went
to class herself, collected notes from Marty’s classes, and typed his
papers, while caring for three-year-old Jane after the babysitter left at
4 p.m. Her workload and responsibilities were so overwhelming that
she often stayed up all night during this period. 38
Upon graduating, Marty got a good law job as an associate
with Weil Gotshal & Manges in New York. Because of Marty's
precarious health, Ruth did not want to risk living apart, so she
moved with him and Jane to New York and transferred to Columbia
Law School. She was designated a Kent Scholar and was offered a
place on the Columbia Law Review, where she excelled. 39 She
36

Id. at 5.
Id. at 349, 373, 402, 416.
38
Id. at 70-73.
39
Ginsburg had the perhaps unique distinction of becoming a member of two law
reviews at prestigious law schools, and it is remarkable that as a transfer student,
she was honored as a Kent Scholar. In 1978, in a historic first, her daughter Jane
Ginsburg was also elected to the Harvard Law Review, making them the first
mother-daughter team in Harvard history. Id. at 278.
37
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graduated first in her class and had lined up a summer clerkship at a
premier law firm. As her biographer accurately notes:
A job offer should have been a foregone conclusion
for a student tied for first place in the graduating class
at Columbia Law School. Serving on the law reviews
of both Harvard and Columbia and clerking
successfully at a premier New York law firm were just
icing on the cake. Such superb credentials typically
guaranteed offers from top Wall Street firms or a
coveted clerkship with a judge on a federal appeals
court.40
Ginsburg, however, was disappointed. While she knew she had
performed well in her summer clerkship, Paul Weiss did not make
her an offer; it had hired an African American woman, Pauli Murray,
as an associate and apparently thought that was sufficient to show its
commitment to diversity. She was interviewed by a dozen law firms
but received only two second interviews and no offer.41
The other coveted option was a federal court clerkship. Her
professors at Columbia recommended her enthusiastically, but as she
ruefully noted, she had three strikes against her: she was a woman, a
Jew, and a mother of a young child. 42 Columbia Law Professor
Gerald Gunther,43 who admired her ability, went from office to office
of the Second Circuit judges in Foley Square lobbying to get her a
40

Id. at 78. The law firm was Paul Weiss.
Id. at 78-79.
42
Id. at 79.
43
Gerald Gunther, who was only six years older than Ginsburg, was a remarkable
man who became her lifelong counselor. He was born in 1927 in a small German
town where his family had lived for centuries. The family fled Germany for New
York in 1938 after the synagogue in their town was burned. He graduated from
Brooklyn College in 1949 with an A.B. in History, earned an M.A. in Public Law
and Government from Columbia in 1950, and was awarded an L.L.B. Magna Cum
Laude by Harvard Law School in 1963. He served as a law clerk to Second Circuit
Judge Learned Hand in 1953-54 and subsequently for Chief Justice Earl Warren of
the Supreme Court. Warren credited him with a major role in writing the opinion
in Brown v. Board of Education. After a year in private practice, he was hired by
Columbia Law School where he was in charge of selecting the limited number of
superior graduates who were recommended for court clerkships. He later served on
the Stanford Law School faculty for many years. While he was only six years older
than Ginsburg, she valued him as a counselor for the rest of his life. Gunther’s
constitutional law case book was the most widely used lawbook in the American
law schools.
41
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clerkship, but all the judges refused. 44 Then he contacted every
Southern District federal judge but again was unsuccessful. Finally,
he went after District Judge Edmund L. Palmieri, a Columbia
alumnus, and threatened to never send him another Columbia law
clerk if he refused to hire Ginsburg. Palmieri agreed, and she quickly
won him over with her brilliance and hard work. 45
After the end of her clerkship with Judge Palmieri, Ginsburg
would have welcomed an opportunity for an appellate or Supreme
Court clerkship, but she was offered none. Thus, she welcomed an
offer by Columbia Professor Hans Smit, the founding director of
Columbia Law School’s Project on International Procedure, to
research and prepare a chapter on Sweden’s new code of civil
procedure as part of a comparative analysis of foreign legal systems’
procedural codes. She agreed, traveled to Sweden, learned Swedish,
and co-authored the study with Anders Bruzelius, a Swedish judge.46
After returning from Europe, in 1960 Ginsburg accepted a
full-time teaching position at Rutgers Law School, where she taught
until 1973.47 She was eager, however, to obtain a position at a firsttier law school. Harvard, where she had begun legal studies in 1954,
offered her a visiting position, but she declined because commuting
from New York would have been arduous. She became pregnant
again and gave birth to her son James in 1965. In 1969, she was
promoted to full professor, and James entered nursery school. In
1972, she got her chance to teach at her alma mater, Columbia; she
was hired as its first female full professor in 1972 and taught one of
the first courses in Women’s Law. 48
PIONEERING LITIGATION FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS
While teaching law, Ginsburg also worked for years on
women’s rights litigation for the American Civil Liberties Union, and
she was a founder of the Women’s Rights Project, which she later
headed. At Rutgers, Ginsburg was paid less than a comparable male
44

Her first choice, Learned Hand, would not even consider a female clerk. DE
HART, supra note 1, at 80.
45
Id. at 80-84.
46
Id. at 85-89. Berzelius’s daughter had been a Kent Scholar at Columbia Law
School. Id. at 85.
47
Id. at 90-99.
48
The New York Times headline in January 1972 read “Columbia Law Snares a
Prize in its Quest for Women Professors.” Id. at 139.
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professor who had a family to support. Dean Willard Heckel
rationalized that practice because Ruth’s husband earned a good
salary.49 As a Rutgers professor, Ginsburg became active in litigating
cases brought by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). At
the ACLU she relied upon three other pioneer crusaders for women’s
rights. Dorothy Kenyon had combated discrimination against women
as a member of the ACLU national executive board and chair of the
Women’s Rights Committee since the 1930s.50 Kenyon favored
utilizing the equal protection clause to combat laws and practices
which discriminated against women, however benevolent their
ostensible purposes were. She had worked in the ACLU for decades
on this project and was joined in 1965 on the executive board by
Pauli Murray.51 According to De Hart, Kenyon and Murray
“intensely … wanted to bring an equal protection case before the
Court.”52 The third woman was Harriet Pilpel. 53
Ginsburg built on the pioneering efforts and legal analysis of
these women in using the equal protection clause to advance
women’s rights. During the first eight decades following passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which was enacted in 1868 to protect the
rights of freed slaves, its application had been limited to racial
discrimination: The Supreme Court had never upheld a claim that the
equal protection clause prohibited gender discrimination. Inspired by
the legal work of Murray and Kenyon, Ginsburg was a lead attorney
in several major court cases in the 1970s which pioneered this area of
litigation. Her victories in the Supreme Court changed this field of
law forever. As two law professors conclude:
Between 1970 and 1980, social movement advocacy
and brilliant litigation by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
49

IRIN CARMON & SHANA KNIZHNIK, THE
OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG 46-47 (2015).
50
DE HART, supra note 1, at 129-30.
51

NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND TIMES

Murray, a remarkable woman of color, had graduated from Howard Law School
in 1944; she was awarded a Rosenthal Fellowship for graduate study at Harvard
Law School but was rejected because of her sex. She earned a Master of Law
degree from Boalt Hall (Berkley) Law School and was the first Black woman to
earn a J.S.D. (a doctorate in jurisprudence) from Yale, which honored her by
naming a new undergraduate residence hall for her in 2017. Id. at 130-33. See also
supra note 41.
52
Id. at 148. Reed v. Reed was to present that opportunity.
53
Pilpel had crusaded for birth control and the right to use contraception since the
1930s and was counsel for Planned Parenthood. DE HART, supra note 1, at 180.
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others changed our Constitutional law.
Cases
beginning with Reed v. Reed demonstrated that in
important respects, sex was like race: familiar
justifications for excluding women rested on
stereotypes that denied individuals the opportunity to
compete and relegated women to secondary status in
American Society.54
American law and cultural tradition had presumed that law
and other professions were the domain of men, while women’s
proper place was in the home, rearing children and managing the
household. The Supreme Court in 1869 rejected the claim that the
Illinois Supreme Court was violating the Equal Protection Clause of
the new Fourteenth Amendment when it denied a woman a license to
practice law.55 With minor exceptions, every state denied women the
right to vote until passage of the Twentieth Amendment in 1920.
Ginsburg was a tireless legal researcher and thinker. She and
her husband Marty, who although he was a tax lawyer sometimes
litigated with her, watched the news attentively for accounts of
persons who felt that they had suffered discrimination because of
gender. If the facts and circumstances presented a promising case,
they sometimes reached out on behalf of the Women’s Rights Project
to offer the person legal services and financial support.
Ruth
shrewdly brought a couple of cases on behalf of male plaintiffs who
had suffered discrimination because of gender stereotypes embedded
in the law; she recognized that male judges might empathize more
with them than with female plaintiffs.56
Reed v. Reed57 the first case, involved a contest between the
adoptive parents of a young man who committed suicide at his
father’s house. The parents were divorced. Both parents applied to
administer their son’s modest estate, but Idaho law provided that
“males must be preferred to females” in such cases, and the trial court
rejected Sally Reed’s application to be the administrator. 58
54

Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From
Struck to Carhart, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1095 (2009) (footnote omitted).
55
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1873). Bradwell’s failure was not
permanent; Illinois later changed the law, and she was admitted to the Illinois Bar
near the end of her life.
56
Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636 (1973); Moritz, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972).
57
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
58
Id. at 73 (citing IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 1).
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Ginsburg’s appeal on behalf of Sally Reed was victorious in the
Idaho District Court, but its decision was reversed by the Idaho
Supreme Court.59 The United States Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the Idaho decision, holding for the first time that such
discrimination on the basis of gender violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 60
The first case that Ginsburg herself argued in the United
States Supreme Court was Frontiero v. Richardson.61 Sharon
Frontiero, a physical therapist at Maxwell Air Force Base Hospital in
Montgomery, Alabama, was denied a housing allowance supplement
to her paycheck which would have been given to similarly situated
males. Her husband Joseph, a navy veteran, was a full-time college
student who also needed medical and dental benefits. Joseph
received a modest monthly veteran’s payment and earned $30.00 a
month working as a night watchman. In order to receive a housing
allowance supplement, married female members of the armed
services had to meet a higher financial support level for their spouse
than was required of married male members. Ginsburg challenged
the constitutionality of a statute which allowed a male serviceman to
claim his spouse as a dependent but denied that right to
servicewomen.62 The case ended in a major victory for the ACLU, as
the Supreme Court agreed with Ginsburg that the statute endorsed
stereotypical views of husbands as providers, unlike wives, and thus
evinced “romantic paternalism” which violated equal protection. 63
In another landmark case, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,64 the
ACLU represented a man whose deceased wife died in childbirth
after having paid Social Security taxes. It successfully challenged the
denial of survivors benefits to the widower, who had been denied
benefits that were given to widows of husbands who had contributed
to Social Security. The deceased wife had been the primary
breadwinner for the family, and the Supreme Court held unanimously
that the statute violated equal protection when it denied survivors
benefits to the widower and his infant son. 65 Ginsburg argued the
59

Id. at 74.
DE HART, supra note 1, at 181-82.
61
411 U.S. 677 (1971).
62
DE HART, supra note 1, at 197.
63
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case before the Supreme Court in January 1975, and she then rushed
back to New York to teach her 2:00 p.m. class. On March 19, the
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed her trial court victory. 66
Professor Ginsburg was the lead ACLU litigator in these
cases, working with Legal Director Melvin Wulf and Executive
Director Aryeh Neier. Her husband Marty worked with her on
Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,67 representing a man
whose mother required fulltime medical care. 68 IRS regulations
provided that single women could get a tax reduction for the
considerable costs of such care, whereas this was denied to a single
man like Moritz. The Ginsburgs, who persuaded Moritz to let them
take his case, argued in Moritz that the differential treatment of
Moritz and similarly situated women was unlawful since it was based
on stereotypical gender role expectations, but the United States Tax
Court nevertheless upheld the regulation. On appeal, however, the
Tenth Circuit reversed and ruled in favor of plaintiff Moritz.69
By the end of the 1970s, Ginsburg had litigated six cases in
the Supreme Court and had won five. She was recognized as the
leading authority on women and the law. Another case which might
have made history, however, was never decided by the Supreme
Court: Struck v. Secretary of Defense.70 Susan Struck was an
unmarried captain in the Air Force who became pregnant in
December 1970 while serving in Vietnam. She was shipped back to
McChord Air Force Base in Washington state and immediately
received discharge orders: An Air Force regulation provided for
prompt dismissal of an officer who got pregnant, although the Air
Force would not dismiss her if she terminated the pregnancy.
Struck, a Roman Catholic who was opposed to abortion,
wanted to carry her pregnancy to term, surrender the baby for
adoption and then resume her military career. However, another Air
Force regulation provided that a commissioned officer would be
promptly terminated if she gave birth to a living child.71 She turned
to ACLU lawyers in Washington State, who brought an action
66

Id. at 247-51.
469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972).
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DE HART, supra note 1, at 126-29, 133-34.
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Id. at 11.
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Id. at 179-96 (“The Case That Got Away”); Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 460 F.2d
1372 (9th Cir. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
71
Id. at 179.
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challenging the constitutionality of her discharge in the federal
district court for the Western District of Washington and applied for a
stay of her discharge until her case could be heard. In the meantime,
she gave birth to a daughter on December 3, 1970, and surrendered
the child to the adoptive parents.
Her attorneys argued that the regulation was unconstitutional
since it violated both her First Amendment free exercise rights and
her Fifth Amendment right to due process, and they sought a
permanent injunction against her dismissal from the service. Two
months after she gave birth, the court dismissed her case, holding the
air force regulation constitutional. In November 1971, a divided
Ninth Circuit court affirmed the lower court’s decision, and Robert
Creisler, her attorney, turned to Ginsburg, who agreed to represent
Struck.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Ginsburg filed the
appellate brief in her capacity as General Counsel for the ACLU
Women’s Rights Project. 72 She had long believed that discrimination
against pregnant women was a core case of sex discrimination. Men
were encouraged to procreate and suffered no damage to their
military careers but instead received salary raises. In the normal
case, moreover, women were able to return to full duties shortly after
giving birth. Courts had traditionally exalted pregnancy and
motherhood as a separate track for women warranting different
treatment; while this ostensibly had a benign purpose, Ginsburg
argued that its effect was to restrain women from developing their
individual talents and capacities.73 The result, she contended, was to
reinforce traditional sex stereotypes and to deny women equal
protection of the laws, rather than making individualized assessments
of women who were fully able to serve.
If the case had been decided by the Supreme Court,
Ginsburg’s Supreme Court brief in Struck might have changed
history and presaged a different course in women’s rights litigation.
Instead, the Air Force changed its regulation and Solicitor General
Erwin Griswold applied to have the Struck appeal dismissed as
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The sagacious arguments that Ginsburg used in her brief in Struck to challenge
laws treating people differently by gender on equal protection grounds are outlined
in Siegel & Siegel, supra note 54.
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moot.74 Struck’s mandatory dismissal from military service was
reversed, and her career was restored. Ginsburg agreed that this
outcome was a just result which her client Struck welcomed;
however, it meant the end of an opportunity for her to make a perhaps
historic Supreme Court argument. Ginsburg had not anticipated the
Solicitor General’s bold stroke. Her biographer comments:
Ginsburg was thus deprived of her first chance for a
Supreme Court victory in the 1972-73 term, in what
was to have been a pairing of cases.
Most
importantly, she had lost her opening wedge in an
effort to get the Court to understand pregnancy
discrimination as sex discrimination. Gone too was
any hope of using Struck to nudge the justices closer
to a view of reproductive freedom as an issue of
liberty and equality. The clock had run out. 75
Meanwhile, separate challenges to statutes outlawing abortion were
moving through the federal courts. 76 Sarah R. Weddington, counsel
for a pregnant woman who wanted an abortion, challenged the Texas
statute as a violation of her client’s marital right of privacy under the
Ninth Amendment, which had been recognized by the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut.77 A three-judge federal district court held
in her favor, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Another
three-judge federal district court in Georgia had struck down parts of
the Georgia abortion statute. 78 Certiorari was also granted in the
74

In the interests of resolving important legal issues despite the fact that the
individual plaintiff’s stake in litigation has inevitably been rendered moot by the
passage of time, as in a case concerning a pregnancy, the Supreme Court has
sometimes permitted an otherwise moot case to be pursued to conclusion on the
ground that it raised an issue “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” United
States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018).
Despite her
disappointment that Struck’s case had been rendered moot, Ginsburg evidently did
not seek to prevent its dismissal on these grounds.
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DE HART, supra note 1, at 188. Before it was dismissed as moot, the Struck case
had been calendared for consideration together with Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton.
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Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Texas 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 379 F. Supp.
1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970). The Texas statute proscribed all abortions except where it
was necessary to save the life of the mother.
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381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Georgia case, which was consolidated for argument with Roe v.
Wade.
While Sarah Weddington in the Texas case apparently did not
consult the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project, Margie Hames, a
member of the ACLU’s national board who led the Atlanta team that
successfully challenged the Georgia statute did so. ACLU Legal
Director Melvin Wulf received the Doe v. Bolton brief and referred it
to Ginsburg for her assessment. After reviewing the brief, she
concluded that the writing was not up to ACLU standards, and she
believed that a stronger, explicit right to abortion based on the
Constitution was required, rather than the weaker implied right. 79
Arguments on Roe and Doe originally took place on
December 13, 1971,80 but there was little agreement among the
justices when the Court met in conference to discuss the two cases.
Thus, it was agreed to schedule re-argument of the two cases for
October 11, 1972, which would allow newly appointed Justices
Powell and Rehnquist to take part. Struck was originally placed on
the calendar for the same day before it was dismissed as moot. 81
Following the second argument on October 11, 1972, the
Court held by seven to two on January 22, 1973, in Roe v. Wade that
the Texas abortion statute was unconstitutional because it violated
Roe’s implied right of privacy. 82 On the same day, the Court in Doe
v. Bolton invalidated Georgia’s law limiting abortion, which was
based on the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code.
New York and three other states had legalized abortion by
statute, but the Supreme Court’s decision evidently struck down the
other forty-six states’ abortion laws. Many champions of abortion
law repeal greeted the decision with jubilation. Harriet Pilpel, chair
of the National Abortion Rights Action League, said that the Roe
decision, when combined with Doe, was “far broader in scope than
anyone expected . . . It scaled the whole mountain. . . We expected to
get there, but not on the first trip . . .”83 Many legal scholars,
the Texas statute challenged in Roe v. Wade. The ALI statute increased the legal
grounds for seeking abortions.
79
DE HART, supra note 1, at 18; Doe, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
80
DE HART, supra note 1, at 185.
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Id. at 184-86.
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Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
83
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including Ginsburg, were less ecstatic and found the opinion
“woefully short on law.”84 Yale Law Professor John Hart Ely, who
favored the right to abortion as a policy, criticized the Supreme Court
opinion as not even law.85
Ginsburg and numerous other prominent legal scholars were
disappointed that equal protection was missing from the Court’s
holding.86 Among this group, all of whom favored a woman’s right
to an abortion, were Catherine MacKinnon, Rhonda Copelon, Reva
Siegel, Robin West, Cass Sunstein, Kenneth Karst, and Laurence
Tribe.87
THE D.C. CIRCUIT
Over the years as a law professor and successful litigator in
the Women’s Rights Project, Ginsburg had reflected on what she
could accomplish as a federal judge. The election of Democrat
Jimmy Carter as president in 1976, after the Nixon and Ford
presidencies, and the enactment of the Omnibus Judgeship Act in
1978 presented an opportunity for liberal judicial candidates. The
statute created thirty-five circuit judgeships, and President Carter had
made a commitment to remedy the tiny number of women judges. 88
As a former clerk to Southern District of New York Judge
Palmieri with New York ties, Ginsburg desired a seat on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. She enjoyed the loyal support of her
husband Marty, and many letter writers also testified to her superior
qualifications. In January 1979, she submitted her responses to the
questionnaire for the Second Circuit and another one for the D.C.
Circuit. Unfortunately, an all-male panel comprised of business
lawyers discerned that she was unfamiliar with securities laws and
disapproved her Second Circuit application. 89
She fared better with respect to the D.C. Circuit. While she
might not otherwise have considered that option, she received a direct
invitation to apply from Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland, who
84
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Id. (citing John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 Yale L. J. 920, 947 (1973)).
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Id. at 193.
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chaired the selection committee. Her candidacy was supported by
scores of letters from her Columbia colleagues and other prominent
lawyers.90 The National Organization of Women’s Legal Defense
Fund, The Women’s Equity Action League and the National
Women’s Political Caucus all endorsed her appointment, as did
Erwin Griswold, District Judge Palmieri, Gerald Gunther, Columbia
Executive Vice President and Former Columbia Law School Dean
Michael Sovern and his successor Dean Albert J. Rosenthal. 91
Her name was on the list of eight nominees sent to the White
House, but she was not one of the two selected. 92 After D.C. Circuit
Judge Harold Leventhal died, however, her prospects improved,
although some liberals questioned the support of Carter and Attorney
General Benjamin Civiletti for her in light of her strong women’s law
background. After months of anxious waiting, Ginsburg was
informed on April 8, 1980, that Carter had signed her nomination. 93
On June 17, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted eight to one to
recommend her, and full Senate ratification swiftly followed. In late
June, Ginsburg was sworn in by Judge Skelly Wright as the newest
judge of the D.C. Circuit.94
Her diligent and thorough preparation and keen legal mind
quickly won her acclaim among the bar and the respect of her
colleagues.
Her companionship with arch-conservative Judge
Antonin Scalia, despite near total disagreement on legal issues,
became legendary. They enjoyed dinner engagements and listening
to opera together. Ginsburg’s legal reputation grew during the
ensuing twelve years of the Reagan and George H.W. Bush
administrations.
By the time Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976, she was on the
top of a list of “leading centrists” in a survey of prospective
Democratic appointees to the United States Supreme Court. 95 Since
no one retired or died during his administration, however, Carter was
the only president in recent history who had no opportunity to
appoint a Supreme Court justice.
90
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The election of Bill Clinton in 1992 gave Democrats the first
opportunity to appoint a Supreme Court Justice since Lyndon
Johnson had appointed Thurgood Marshall in 1967.96 Ginsburg’s
outstanding judicial reputation was universally admired, but there
was one possible reservation among liberal Democrats: her view of
Roe v. Wade. As noted above, her analysis about the best litigation
strategy to secure advancement of abortion rights in the Supreme
Court was based on the equal protection clause rather than on the
right to privacy. Moreover, since she had litigated the Struck case all
the way to the Supreme Court before it became moot in 1972, she had
not changed her approach twenty years later.
THE MADISON LECTURE
Ginsburg had accepted an invitation to present the annual
Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law at New York University Law
School on March 9, 1993. When she gave her speech, Justice
White’s resignation was believed to be imminent. When he did
resign on March 19th, there was widespread public support for her as
his successor. However, the Roe v. Wade decision, which she had
criticized, had been regarded by pro-choice Democrats for twenty
years as a great liberal landmark. Thus, she might have enhanced her
likelihood of being nominated if she had tailored her remarks to show
deference and respect for the decision, but she did not do so; instead,
she remained faithful to the views she had held when she litigated the
Struck case.
Ginsburg began the Madison Lecture by stating that she had
two main themes: human rights and the administration of justice,
particularly in the federal courts. She noted that her views had been
shaped by her years as a “law teacher” in the 1960s and 70s who had
helped to launch the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project and her time
as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit since 1980.97
The first half of Ginsburg’s speech compared American
appellate courts with European courts and indicated that, in her view,
appellate judges should behave with moderation and in creating law
According to De Hart, “By 1991, Ginsburg had jumped to the top in a survey of
“leading centrists” likely to be considered for the Supreme Court.” Id. at 298-99.
97
Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 1185. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor had presented
the NYU Madison Lecture one year earlier. See id. at 1202.
96
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should generally limit themselves to making “interstitial” decisions.
She cited with approval Justice Brennan’s statement defending
appellate judges’ exercise of their prerogative to dissent from
majority opinions but noted that legal scholar Roscoe Pound decades
earlier had decried “intemperate denunciations of . . . colleagues,
violent invective, attributi[on]s of bad motives to the majority of the
court, and insinuations of incompetence, negligence, prejudice or
obtuseness of [other judges].” 98 She then quoted examples of
excessively intemperate remarks in dissents by her friend Justice
Scalia and D.C. Circuit colleague Judge Abner Mikva.99
The second part of Ginsburg’s address was captioned
“MEASURED MOTIONS IN THIRD BRANCH DECISION
MAKING.”100 Ginsburg stated that:
Moving from the style to the substance of third branch
decision-making, I will stress in the remainder of these
remarks that judges play an interdependent part in our
democracy. They do not alone shape legal doctrine
but, as I suggested at the outset, they participate in a
dialogue with other organs of government and with the
people as well.101
She noted that Justice Holmes had “recognize[d] without hesitation”
that judges “do and must legislate,” but “they can do so . . . only
interstitially . . . .”102 She suggested: “Measured motions seem to me
right, in the main, for constitutional as well as common law
adjudication. Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches,
may prove unstable. The most prominent example in recent decades
is Roe v. Wade.”103
To “illustrate” her point, she “[h]ad contrasted that
breathtaking 1973 decision with the Court’s more cautious
dispositions, contemporaneous with Roe, in cases involving explicitly
sex-based classifications …” and “[would] further develop that
comparison here.”104 She noted that the Roe decision had struck
98
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down on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds “a Texas
criminal abortion statute that intolerably shackled a woman’s
autonomy”; the only exception was when abortion was necessary to
save the woman’s life. She continued:
Suppose the Court had stopped there, rightly declaring
unconstitutional the most extreme brand of law in the
nation, and had not gone on, as the Court did in Roe,
to fashion a law blanketing the subject, a set of rules
that displaced virtually every state law then in force.
Would there have been the twenty-year controversy
we have witnessed, reflected most recently in the
Supreme Court’s splintered decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey? A less encompassing Roe, one
that merely struck down the extreme Texas law and
went no further on that day, I believe and will
summarize why, might have served to reduce rather
than to fuel controversy.105
She further suggested that Roe v. Wade might have been “less of a
storm center had it . . . homed in more precisely on the women’s
equality dimension of the issue and, correspondingly, attempted
nothing more bold than the mode of decision making the Court
employed in the 1970s gender classification cases.”106 Ginsburg
went on to describe the Struck case, that could have usefully linked
“reproductive choice” to “disadvantageous treatment of women on
the basis of their sex.”107
Ginsburg noted that originally “the Air Force regime
differentiated invidiously by allowing men who became fathers, but
not women who became mothers, to remain in service” and by
allowing women who underwent abortions but not women who gave
birth to continue their military careers. 108 She noted that the Air
Force had abandoned its regulation and had thereby given Struck a
total victory on the merits, which warranted the case’s dismissal
because of mootness. Moreover, while the Supreme Court majority
had not voted to make sex-based classifications a suspect category for
equal protection purposes, it had adopted her “fallback” suggestion of
105
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an elevated, “intermediate” level of scrutiny for such classifications
that was more stringent than the “rational relationship” test for most
legislation.109 Thus, the Supreme Court could have continued the
“dialogue” that its earlier 1970s decisions had opened with the
political branches of government, to ensure that laws and regulations
“would catch up with a changed world.” 110 While, as she noted,
abortion law “was in a state of change across the nation” toward
“liberalization” of the laws,111 “Roe v. Wade invited no dialogue with
legislators.”112
Nevertheless, Roe was not “measured,” since it “left virtually
no state with laws fully conforming to the Court’s delineation of
abortion still permissible. 113 Around that extraordinary decision, a
well-organized and vocal right-to-life movement rallied and
succeeded, for a considerable time, in turning the legislative tide to
the opposite direction.”114 In a similar vein, former Yale Law
Professor Geoffrey Hazard observed: “By making such an extensive
change, the court [in Roe] foreclosed the usual opportunities for
assimilation [and] feedback . . . that are afforded in a decisional
process involving shorter and more cautious doctrinal steps.” 115
Ginsburg emphasized that “Constitutional review by courts is
an institution that has been for some two centuries our nation’s
hallmark and pride.”116 But she believed that two “extreme modes of
court intervention in social change processes” in the twentieth
century had placed stress on the process: “At one extreme, the
Supreme Court steps boldly in front of the political process, as some
believe it did in Roe;”117 at the other extreme the Court, in the early
part of the century, “thrust” itself into “the rearguard opposing
change, striking down, as unconstitutional, laws embodying a new
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philosophy of economic regulation at odds with the nineteenth
century’s laissez-faire approach.”118
Ginsburg compared the development of civil rights law
following Brown v. Board of Education 119 to the 1970s development
of women’s equal rights cases. The Court’s decisions broadening
women’s rights in the 1970s had helped to educate society on
women’s subordination and had made possible a gradual expansion
of those rights. In contrast, Blacks “were confined in a separate
sector” of society and prospects were bleak for renouncing the
“separate but equal” doctrine and “apartheid” that it embodied, 120 so
that justified the Supreme Court’s stepping ahead of the political
branches “in pursuit of a constitutional precept” as in Brown v. Board
of Education.121
Ginsburg suggested that while the Supreme Court Justices
“…generally follow, they do not lead, changes taking place
elsewhere in society…” sometimes they can effectively “signal a
green light for a social change.” 122 “Roe, on the other hand, halted a
political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby, I
believe, prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the
issue.”123 Maybe in consequence of that error, she suggested, the
most recent (at that time) abortion decision, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,124 had retreated from Roe and lessened women’s rights.125
Ginsburg concluded by recalling the wise counsel that her
“teacher and friend,” Professor Gerald Gunther, had offered when she
was installed as a judge in 1980:
The good judge . . . is open-minded and detached . . .
heedful of limitations stemming from the judge’s own
competence and, above all, from the presuppositions
of our constitutional scheme; th[at] judge . . .
118
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recognizes that a felt need to act only interstitially
does not mean relegation of judges to a trivial or
mechanical role, but rather affords the most
responsible room for creative, important judicial
contributions.”126
Ginsburg explained that “Professor Gunther had in mind a great
jurist, Judge Learned Hand,” whose biography he was completing at
that time.127
The modest, measured tone of Gunther’s description of “the
good judge” is striking. Gunther passed up the opportunity to shower
his protégé with praise (Ginsburg knew how greatly he respected and
indeed admired her). Instead, I think he was holding up the model of
the good common law judge, and his model was Hand, for whom he
had clerked.128
Two weeks before the invasion of Normandy on “D Day,”
whose success spelled doom for the Third Reich tyranny, the great
judge Learned Hand had addressed almost one and a half million
people in New York’s Central Park at the annual “I am an American”
day. His speech on May 21, 1944 contained the following famous
words:
126

Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 1209.
Gunther had clerked for Judge Learned Hand (1872-1961) on the Second Circuit
in 1953-54 after he graduated from Columbia Law School. His biography of Hand,
which totaled eight hundred pages and clearly constituted a labor of love, was
published in 1994; a second edition with a preface by Ginsburg was published in
2011. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND, THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).
Ginsburg was too gracious to mention that Hand had been her first choice for a
clerkship when she received her Columbia law degree in 1959, a position for which
he would not consider a woman.
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Learned Hand majored in philosophy at Harvard Collee, graduating Phi Beta
Kappa with highest honors, was awarded an Artium Magister degree as well as an
Artium Baccalaureus degree, and was chosen by his classmates to deliver the Class
Day oration. He also graduated with an LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1896.
Following an unsuccessful stint as a practicing lawyer, he was appointed a federal
district judge for the Southern District of New York at the young age of thirtyseven in 1909 and was appointed to the Second Circuit in 1924. His distinguished
law school professors included James Bradley Thayer, Christopher Columbus
Langdell, Samuel Williston, John Chipman Gray, and James Barr Ames.
GUNTHER, supra note 127 at 32; KATHRYN GRIFFITH, JUDGE LEARNED HAND AND
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What then is the spirit of Liberty? I cannot define
it; I can only tell you my own faith. The Spirit of
liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right;
the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to
understand the minds of other men; the spirit of liberty
is the spirit which weighs their interests alongside its
own without bias . . .129
The hesitancy to be certain that he was right influenced Learned
Hand throughout his long federal judicial career. He was a strong
supporter of civil rights and freedom of speech, often opposing public
opinion. One of his most famous decisions as district judge was
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,130 in which he ruled in favor of a
radical magazine which was charged with violation of the Sedition
Act when it urged men to resist the draft during World War I. While
the decision was widely unpopular and was reversed by the Second
Circuit, it helped influence Justices Homes and Brandeis, whose
jurisprudence later evolved towards greater defense of the right to
advocate unpopular political causes that did not pose a serious threat
to the peace.131
Nevertheless, because of his scrupulous
determination to reach just results and his gift for eloquence, he was
the federal judge whose opinions were the most widely cited by other
courts during his lifetime.132
I think that Learned Hand, a universally admired judge,
served as a role model for Ginsburg during her tenure on both the
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court. As noted, above, he was her
first choice as the judge to clerk for after graduating from law school.
I believe that while she regretted his bias in declining to even
consider a female clerk, she was nevertheless willing to recognize his
greatness as a judge.
129
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To sum up Ginsburg's Madison Address, while her criticism
of the Roe decision was somewhat oblique, her disagreement was
unmistakable. She felt it was “sweeping,” “breathtaking,” and not
“measured.” In a 1985 address at the University of North Carolina
Law School, she observed that the Supreme Court’s cases applying
equal protection analysis to gender-based classifications which had
advanced women’s rights had not provoked much controversy. In
contrast, the Court in Roe v. Wade “ha[d] treated reproductive
autonomy under a substantive due process/personal autonomy
headline, . . .” and the case became a “storm center,” sparking public
opposition and academic criticism, “in part, I believe, because the
Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an
incomplete justification for its action.”133
Since the Court had fashioned “a law blanketing the subject, a
set of rules that displaced virtually every state law then in force,” it
had missed the opportunity to initiate a dialogue with the Texas
Legislature on the issues as it could have by merely striking down the
draconian Texas statute and then waiting for Texas to respond. She
noted that Professor Archibald Cox had described Roe’s trimester
approach as “read[ing] like a set of hospital rules and regulations,” 134
and that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor also opposed the trimester
approach.135 Like many critics of Roe, Ginsburg was in favor of
abortion rights, although she noted that she “was not at that time or
any other time thereafter personally engaged in reproductive
autonomy litigation.”136
LAW PROFESSORS CRITIQUE ROE V. WADE
The majority of law professors nationwide probably
supported the right to an abortion, albeit many found the Supreme
Court opinion in Roe v. Wade disappointing. This gave Professor
133
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Jack Balkin of Yale Law School, thirty years later, the idea of
consulting legal experts on how they would have decided Roe and its
companion case Doe v. Bolton137 if they had been Supreme Court
justices in 1973. Eleven law school professors accepted his invitation
and made presentations at a symposium in New Haven on how they
would have decided the case; these were subsequently published. 138
While only three professors opposed the legalization of abortion
(Michael Stokes Paulsen, Teresa Collett, and Jeffrey Rosen), none of
the other eight fully approved the reasoning of the 1973 decision, and
none adopted Justice Blackmun’s original trimester framework.
Moreover, their pro-abortion rights decisions varied widely. Given
the fact that the Roe holding was based on a posited right of privacy
not anchored in an explicit constitutional provision, this was no doubt
inevitable.
Balkin’s own opinion held that abortion statutes violated both
women’s liberty and equality because they forced women to become
mothers in a society where they still bear most of the responsibility
for childcare. However, state legislatures could set a statutory
deadline for exercising the right to an abortion, after which they
could restrict or even completely prohibit abortions.139 Instead, he
would permit states to experiment with various deadlines for women
to exercise the abortion right. 140 Significantly, in light of his strong
conviction about the wrongfulness of abortion prohibition statutes,
Balkin acknowledged how difficult it was to articulate a
constitutional basis for holding thus:
Moreover, the question of abortion rights is legally
difficult and morally complex, bringing together
issues of life and death, humanity, equality, and
liberty. The problems the Justices faced in Roe were
as trying in their own way as any set of questions that
come before the courts. Given the legal and moral
137
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difficulty of the issues and the inevitable need to make
compromises, it was perhaps too much to expect that
the Court would get it right the first time, under almost
anyone’s standards of what ‘getting it right’ might
mean . . .141
Instead, he suggested, the Court “might have developed its ideas more
fully over a course of decisions, perhaps in tandem with its sexequality jurisprudence;” and while that probably would not have made
abortion uncontroversial, “it might have produced a fairer, more
flexible, and more democratically acceptable set of legal doctrines.” 142
In addition, Balkin said that the Justices should have
recognized that their decision was bound to cause “a significant
upheaval in American politics” and should have tried harder to win
public support and assuage criticism . . .”143 He commended Chief
Justice Warren’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,144 another
extremely controversial decision that effected historic change, as “a
model of eloquence and understatement, brief and statesmanlike,
fully aware of its political context and deliberately designed to avoid
confrontation and to conserve the Court’s legitimacy . . .”145 In
contrast, Blackmun’s decisions in Roe and Doe, while full of
scholarship and medical history, were “long-winded” and “devote[d]
a very significant amount of space to technical legal issues.” 146
Indeed, “Blackmun’s opinion in Roe was so complicated that
Blackmun himself at one point contemplated writing an addendum
explaining its meaning.”147
Echoing Justice Ginsburg’s approach in her Madison Address,
Balkin concluded that “[p]erhaps Roe’s most important shortcoming
was not its failure to ‘get it right’ but its relative inattention to the
interactions between courts and politics “and to how courts, whether
they like it or not, always work in conversation with the political
branches in developing constitutional norms.” 148 And while courts
141
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often have to protect rights from political interference, “those rights .
. . also arise out of politics, they are tested by politics, and they are
modified by courts as a result of politics.” 149 Balkin concluded:
Despite the attention that has been paid to Roe, the
constitutional right to abortion, as it exists today, is
not solely the work of the federal judiciary. Like all
important constitutional ideas, it is the work of a
dialectical process that engages all the major
institutions of American lawmaking, and it has been
fashioned through controversy and strife, through trial
and error – and with many mistakes and hesitations
along the way – out of the raw materials of American
politics.150
Among the other law professors’ model opinions, Reva Siegel
argued that the proper basis of the abortion right is women’s equality
and that abortion is a constitutional right necessary to secure
women’s equal citizenship. 151 Mark Tushnet believed that the allmale Supreme Court justices of 1973 did not understand the
connection between abortion rights and the Equal Protection Clause.
He based his opinion on Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Doe v.
Bolton, which Justice Brennan had joined. 152
Four other participants, Anita Allen, Robin West, Jed
Rubenfeld and Cass Sunstein, concurred in the judgment that both the
Texas and Georgia statutes were unconstitutional, but for different
reasons. Anita Allen grounded her opinion on women’s procreative
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. 153 Jed Rubenfeld argued
that the constitutional right to privacy is part of a “general prohibition
against totalitarian policies that take over people’s private lives” and
“conscript women, forcing them ‘to carry out a specific, sustained,
long-term, life-altering and life-occupying course of conduct.”’ 154
Robin West argued that restrictions on abortion violated both
women’s liberty and their equality, imposing on them duties of “good
samaritanship” that states do not impose on any other persons. She
149
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thought that Congress is the best body to enact laws that would
protect women’s equality and would secure their equal citizenship. 155
Cass Sunstein believes in a theory he calls judicial
minimalism, in which courts should ordinarily decide cases on
narrow grounds and leave many things undecided and thereby act as
catalysts for democratic deliberation. He supported the results in Roe
and Doe on the grounds that abortion statutes were overbroad since
they abridged too much constitutionally protected liberty. 156
Jeffrey Rosen dissented from both Roe and Doe because he
believed that the right of privacy has no basis in the Constitution and
that the Supreme Court should have left the issue of abortion rights to
legislatures. He agreed with many of the arguments made by John
Hart Ely against Roe v. Wade and believed that the hasty and illconsidered decision in Roe simply exacerbated political division and
might have undermined the trend towards protection of abortion
rights before the 1973 decision. 157
Akhil Amar had an interesting position: He concluded that the
Texas abortion statute in Roe was unconstitutional since it was
enacted in the 1850s, while women only obtained the right to vote
with passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. In contrast, he
believed that the Court should have abstained from adjudicating the
Georgia statute, passed in 1968, which was challenged in Doe v.
Bolton, and left its interpretation to the Georgia courts.
Michael Stokes Paulsen believes that abortion is deeply
immoral and that the Supreme Court has severely damaged its
authority by declaring it to be a fundamental right and thereby
becoming complicit in the destruction of so many innocent human
lives.158 He states that “[p]lainly, abortion kills a living being,” and
155
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“[i]t is equally plain that the living being killed by an abortion is a
human living being” and “[t]he act of abortion thus ends a human
life.”159 He argued that “[i]t is somewhat amusing (but also
somewhat pathetic and dispiriting) to observe the other members of
the Court flailing around, so desperately and so very creatively—and
so inconsistently with one another!—and with such evident desire to
reach a predetermined preferred result, trying to torture an argument
out of the Constitution’s text in support of a ‘right’ of some kind . . .
to kill human beings gestating in their mothers’ wombs.”160
Teresa Collett argued that Roe is the product of a misguided
radical individualism that undermines women’s liberty and equality.
She contends that making abortion freely available allows men to
escape responsibility for sex and parenthood and treats women’s
bodies as something unnatural and something to be altered to
conform to the male model.161
JUDGE WILKINSON’S CRITIQUE OF ROE V. WADE
A detailed and rather devastating critique of Roe v. Wade was
written by United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson, who was equally caustic about District of
Columbia v. Heller,162 the radical decision in which the Supreme
Court held for the first time since the ratification of the Second
Amendment that there was an individual constitutional right to own
guns at least in the District of Columbia, which is a federal entity. 163
Wilkinson criticized both cases for “fashioning novel
substantive rights,” “descending into the political thicket,” “ignoring
the Legislature’s strengths” and “disregarding federalism’s
virtues.”164 According to Wilkinson:
Both decisions share four major shortcomings: an
absence of a commitment to textualism; a willingness
159
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to embark on a complex endeavor that will require
fine tuning over many years of litigation; a failure to
respect legislative judgments; and a rejection of the
principles of federalism. These failings have two
things in common. First, each represents a rejection of
neutral principles that counseled restraint and
deference to others regardless of the issues involved.
Second, each represents an act of judicial
aggrandizement; a transfer of power to judges from
political branches of government – and thus,
ultimately, from the people themselves. 165
Wilkinson charged the Court with creating a “newly
discovered right to abortion” without any relationship to the text or
structure of the Constitution,” something they should never have
done.166 He also gave examples of leading authorities’ criticisms of
Roe. Gerald Gunther was unable “to find a satisfying rationale to
justify Roe . . . on the basis of modes of constitutional interpretation I
consider legitimate.”167 Alexander Bickel asserted that the Court
“refused the discipline to which its function is properly subject; it
simply asserted the result it reached. This is all the Court could do
because moral philosophy, logic, reason, or other materials of law”
could not resolve the question of whether abortion should be
permitted.”168 Wilkinson concluded that the Roe decision gave rise
to the modern conservative movement because it violated neutral
principles of “textualism, structuralism, federalism, historicism and
plain old modesty and restraint.”169 Richard Epstein flatly labeled the
decision “comprehensive legislation” which the seven justices had
“enacted” in the name of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.170
The Court in Roe had imposed on itself an enormous future
burden: by 2009, thirty-six years after the 1973 decision, it had
decided more than twenty-five abortion cases, and lower courts had
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decided hundreds more. 171 Moreover, Wilkinson argued, legislative
bodies accustomed to compromise and able to study fraught political
issues over time were better suited to decide them than courts
deciding individual cases. As Justice Scalia charged, the Supreme
Court with its set of detailed regulations ended up creating what
could accurately be called an “Abortion Code,” i.e., it was in effect
exercising legislative power which it had no business doing.172
Justice Rehnquist had labeled the Roe decision “judicial legislation”
in his original 1973 dissent.173
Wilkinson proceeded to make a case that it was unwise for the
Court in Roe to enter the “thicket” of such a controversial and
politically fraught issue as the right to an abortion, especially when
there is no clear “constitutional guidance” to assist in resolving
controversies about the permissible scope of such a right. For
instance, numerous states have enacted laws requiring parental
consent for young girls to receive an abortion but permitting a
“judicial bypass” if parents unreasonably refuse their consent. He
noted that as of 2009, the Supreme Court had considered parental
consent requirements and judicial bypass procedures eight times in
sixteen years.174
Yale Law Professor John Hart Ely had published one of the
major articles criticizing Roe v. Wade less than a year after the
decision.175
Abortion rights supporters are outraged by the
unavailability of abortion facilities in large areas of the country,
especially in the South, and they do not see why the exercise of a
constitutional right proclaimed by the Supreme Court half a century
ago should be nearly impossible in such areas. 176 However, Professor
Ely, while he favored statutory abortion rights, believed that the
171
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Court should not “second guess legislative balances” and disregard
the lessons of community experience which influence compromises
resulting from the political process.177 In his dissent in Roe, Justice
Rehnquist had emphasized the superior ability of legislatures
studying conflicting claims and complicated medical and scientific
issues at length, “unconstrained by judicial rules on standing and
evidence.”178 Others had criticized Roe for ignoring what Justice
Brandeis had referred to as the “happy incident” of our federal
system, which permitted the states to serve as natural laboratories for
experimentation and innovation. 179
Justice Scalia argued that while Americans were deeply and
rather evenly split on the morality of abortion as a nation, the
different regions were not representative of the whole, that is, states
on the coasts tended to be predominantly pro-choice, while rural and
deep Southern areas were more pro-life. Thus, leaving the issue to its
traditional status as part of states’ police power would respect the
views of the largest number of Americans. Wilkinson observed that
legislative bodies were far better suited to dealing through
compromise with such fraught issues, which they could study over
long periods, without having to reach a decision in the case. In
contrast, courts which are compelled to decide cases had no such
flexibility, and they have to issue decisions within reasonable time
frames.180
“THE GOOD JUDGE”
I wish to return now to the thought-provoking message which
Gerald Gunther delivered when Ginsburg was sworn in as an
appellate judge in December 1980:
The good judge . . . is open minded and detached . . .
heedful of limitations stemming from the judge’s own
competence and, above all, from the presuppositions
of our constitutional scheme; and [th]at judge . . .
recognizes that a felt need to act only interstitially
177
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does not mean relegation of judges to a trivial or
mechanical role, but rather affords the most
responsible room for creative, important judicial
contributions.181
I think that Gerald Gunther, when he spoke these words, was holding
up the model of a good common law judge, and Ginsburg obviously
agreed with him. Imbued with the scrupulous and cautious spirit of
his mentor, Judge Learned Hand, Gunther felt that a judge should act
with restraint. Despite his brilliant academic success at Harvard,
Hand was full of insecurity and self-doubt all his life.182 When
writing opinions, he would often agonize over the merits, and he
sometimes would go through numerous drafts of an opinion before it
became final.
Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist described the judiciary
as “the least dangerous branch” of government because it “had no
influence over either the sword or the purse . . . It may truly be said to
have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.” 183 As we
have seen, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton are open to the charge that
the Supreme Court was in effect legislating when it issued the
decisions.184 Ginsburg appreciated how the law involved a dialogue
between courts, legislative bodies and the general public, and she
noted that courts generally follow, rather than leading, changes taking
place elsewhere in society. 185 For this reason, she appreciated the
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value of an incremental, interstitial approach to judicial progress, 186
and this has always been how the common law evolved.
The common law system was the basic original framework of
Anglo-American law. For centuries during the Middle Ages, the
common law developed incrementally, when the king’s judges
traveled around the realm and had to adjudicate disputes between the
king’s subjects. The most common civil forms of action were torts
and contracts. Over the years, the courts built up a body of judgemade law which honored precedent. When an instant case raised
essentially the same question of law as one from the year before,
stare decisis dictated that the judge should follow precedent rather
than reaching a new and different conclusion in the new case. If a
case could be narrowly decided, based on a limited legal issue, then
the judge was supposed to decide it thus and avoid stating a broad
principle that might lead to results in a future case that the judge did
not intend. The courts were to proceed incrementally, by baby steps,
since if a court made a mistake, it would require a smaller repair job
to fix it.
While it is customary to distinguish common law from
constitutional law, they actually have much in common. Their major
difference is that constitutional law is anchored in a permanent legal
text, which can only be altered through the arduous and demanding
process of amendment; in contrast, statutes can be altered or repealed
by a mere majority vote. Yet the brevity and generality of
constitutional provisions necessitates that courts explain, elaborate
and expand on their meaning. In doing so they are continuing to
create a body of constitutional common law.187
With respect to Roe v. Wade, Ginsburg was concerned about
“the fragile textual backing for privacy upon which Roe rested,
deriving as it did from what many legal scholars had regarded as
sloppy jurisprudence in the earlier Griswold decision.”188 She firmly
believed that basing a woman’s right to an abortion on the equal
protection clause would make it less vulnerable to legal challenge.
She imagined that if the Court had merely struck down the extreme
Texas prohibition of abortion without more, that could have opened a
dialogue between state legislatures, their citizens and the courts, and
See id. at 1209 (regarding Gunther’s remarks at her D.C. Circuit installation).
See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975).
188
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“[l]aws that proved too restrictive could then have been challenged so
that the Court might proceed incrementally, giving the public more
time to adjust.”189 She feared that the “backlash” that greeted Roe
might intensify and threaten “the institutional legitimacy and
authority” of the Supreme Court itself. 190
The Supreme Court majority of seven to two in Roe v. Wade
may have believed that it was timely and appropriate to issue a
uniform national rule on abortion in what Justice Ginsburg called
“that breathtaking 1973 decision. 191 They may have thought that they
were achieving judicial economy by thus speeding up the process to
conclusion. However, in 1993, Justice Ginsburg questioned whether
this result was “worth it,” since “a well-organized and vocal right-tolife movement rallied and succeeded, for a considerable time, in
turning the legislative tide in the opposite direction.”192 Ginsburg
further stated that “Roe . . . halted a political process that was moving
in a reform direction and thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness
and deferred stable settlement of the issue.” 193
“BURKEAN MINIMALISM” AND “THE GOOD JUDGE”
I believe that a legal philosophy which has been called
“Burkean minimalism” accurately describes the judicial philosophy
that Ginsburg received from Gerald Gunther’s description of how a
“good judge” decides cases.194
Professor Cass Sunstein has
elaborated this jurisprudential approach in his writing. The label of
course refers to Edmund Burke, 195 the great Irish statesman and
conservative political philosopher who published his famous work
only a year after the French Revolution. 196 Sunstein comments:
“Burke opposes theories and abstractions, developed by individual
189
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minds, to traditions built up by many minds over long periods,” 197
including the common law. Burke wrote in the following famous
passage:
We wished at the period of the Revolution, and we do
now wish, to derive all we possess as an inheritance
from our forefathers . . . The science of government
being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for
such practical purposes, a matter which requires
experience, and even more experience that any person
can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and
observing he maybe, it is with infinite caution that any
man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice
which has answered in any tolerable degree, for ages
the common purposes of society, or on building it up
again, without having models and patterns of approved
utility before his eyes.198
Sunstein’s calls his interpretation of the Constitution “Burkean
minimalism” and defines it as follows:
Burkean minimalists believe that constitutional
principles must be built incrementally and by analogy,
with close reference to long-standing practices. Like
all minimalists, Burkeans insist on incrementalism but
they also emphasize the need for judges to pay careful
heed to established traditions and to avoid independent
moral and political arguments of any kind.199
Sunstein cites Justices Felix Frankfurter and Sandra Day
O’Connor as “the most prominent practitioners of Burkean
minimalism, in the sense that they have tended to favor small steps
and close attention to both experience and tradition.”200 He
distinguishes Burkean minimalists, from “originalists” and
”conservative perfectionists,” but notes that “all three disapprove of
those forms of liberal thought that culminated in the work of the
Warren Court and on occasion its successors.”201 He further notes
that “[a]ll three approaches are at least skeptical of Roe v. Wade” and
197

Sunstein, supra note 194, at 369.
EDMUND BURKE, THE PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 451 (1999).
199
Sunstein, supra note 194, at 356.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 358.
198

572

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

“the effort to remove religion from the public sphere . . . .” 202
Burkeans value narrow, incompletely theorized rulings and thus
reject both width and depth.”203
One important feature of Burkean minimalism is
“narrowness;” Burkean minimalists favor “narrow” rulings, “which
do not venture far beyond the problem at hand, and attempt to focus
on the particulars of the dispute before the Court.” 204 “Wide” rulings
are the opposite of “narrow” ones, and “[m]inimalists fear that wide
rulings will produce errors that are at once serious and difficult to
reverse – a particular problem when the stakes are high.”205
Secondly, Burkean minimalists favor “rulings that are shallow
rather than deep. Shallow rulings attempt to produce rationales and
outcomes on which diverse people can agree, notwithstanding their
disagreement on or uncertainty about the most fundamental
issues.”206
Sunstein suggests that “shallow” rulings may prevent errors
and “promote social peace,” because the meanings of the same
general terms may be interpreted differently by people who can
nevertheless agree on the terms used.207
As far as “tradition” is concerned, Burke thought that
“reasonable citizens, aware of their own limitations, will effectively
delegate authority to their own traditions,” which embody “the
judgments of many people operating over time.”208 This has
particular relevance to the common law:
Burke sees his claims as a reason to value rather than
to repudiate the common law, which he goes so far as
to call the ‘pride of the human intellect.’ Burke
contends that ‘with all its defects, redundancies, and
errors,’ jurisprudence counts as ‘the collected reason
of ages, combining the principles of original justice
with the infinite variety of human concerns. 209
202
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A final problem that Sunstein addresses is “the Burkean
dilemma.” “Burkean minimalists respect the demands of stare
decisis, believing as they do that entrenched decisions may well
embody wisdom and that new departures are likely to have
unanticipated consequences, especially if existing law is embodied in
social practices as well as judicial doctrines.” 210 But if Burkean
minimalists disagreed on the premises of the original decision, then
how should they deal with it when it has been entrenched for years?
This “dilemma” has no easy answer. One option is to narrow
considerably the entrenched decision without overruling it, and
moreover,
[i]t is easy to see how Burkeans might be drawn to this
way of dealing with Roe v. Wade. But it would not be
out of bounds for Burkeans to conclude that the most
indefensible departures from their preferred method
must be sharply cabined or even overruled, at least if it
is possible to do so without disrupting reasonable
expectations or undoing a great deal of the fabric of
existing law. Committed Burkeans might well take
this approach to Roe . . .211
“No Burkean is likely to believe that Roe was correct in the
first instance,”212 but some might conclude that it has become so
embedded in social practices that overruling it might create “a kind of
social upheaval.”213 Thus, “reasonable Burkeans” could disagree
about whether to overrule Roe v. Wade.
Sunstein summarizes his article as follows:
Burkeans value narrow, incompletely theorized rulings
and thus reject both width and depth. What Burkeans
add is an emphasis on the need to develop law with
close reference to established practices and traditions
and a corresponding distrust of judicial judgments that
are not firmly rooted in long-standing experience…214
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Sunstein presented his minimalist judicial philosophy more
fully in a 1999 book. 215 At that time, the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether there was a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide. A majority of five justices merely said that there is
no general right to suicide, assisted or otherwise, but it left open the
possibility that under special circumstances, people might have a
right to assisted suicide after all. 216 He commented:
In other words, the Court left the most fundamental
questions undecided.
Far from being odd or
anomalous, this is the current Court’s usual approach.
In this way, the Court is part of a long historical
tradition. Anglo-American courts often take small
rather than large steps, bracketing the hardest and
most divisive issues.
My goal in this book is to identify and to defend a
distinctive form of judicial decision-making, which I
call “minimalism.”217
He further explains:
Procedure first: A minimalist court settles the case
before it, but it leaves many things undecided. It is
alert to the existence of reasonable disagreement in a
heterogeneous society. It knows that there is much
that it does not know; it is intensely aware of its own
limitations. It seeks to decide cases on narrow
grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions.
Alert to the problem of unanticipated consequences, it
sees itself as part of a system of democratic
deliberation; it attempts to promote the democratic
ideals of participation, deliberation and responsiveness
. . . To the extent that it can, it seeks to provide rulings
that can attract support from people with diverse
theoretical commitments.218
Minimalism is not a form of judicial “activism.” On the contrary,
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Minimalists are protective of their own precedents and
cautious about imposing their own views on the rest of
society. Certainly, they disfavor broad rules that
would draw a wide range of democratically enacted
legislation into question . . . They prefer to leave
fundamental issues undecided. This is their most
distinctive characteristic . . . 219
Sunstein discusses Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade at
length. With regard to Roe, he states that “[p]erhaps the Roe
outcome was correct as a matter of substantive constitutional theory .
. . . But at least it seems reasonable to think that the democratic
process would have done much better with the abortion issue if the
Court had proceeded more cautiously and in a humble and more
interactive way.”220
Minimalists clearly have great respect for Alexander Bickel,
the great Yale Law School professor who wrote The Least Dangerous
Branch.221 Bickel championed “the passive virtues,” which are
exercised when a court refuses to assume jurisdiction.222 This is not
necessarily because the case is unimportant, but because it is
untimely to do so. This is inevitable in many cases where the
Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari because its vast
potential docket makes it impossible to grant much more than 1% of
such petitions. As Sunstein further observes, the passive virtues are
also served by the principle of justiciability: “The basic principles of
justiciability are designed to limit the occasions for judicial
interference with political processes.”
Sunstein further realizes that:
[t]hose who favor passive virtues, narrow decisions,
incompletely theorized agreements tend to be humble
about their own capacities. They are not by any
means skeptics; but with respect to questions of both
substance and method, they are not too sure that they
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are right. They know that their own attempts at theory
may fail . . .223
A minimalist approach is also appropriate “where facts and values are
in flux:”
Minimalists refuse to freeze existing ideals and
conceptions; in this way they retain a good deal of
room for future deliberation and choice. This is
especially important for judges who are not too sure
that they are right.224
Since there is a natural desire among most people for clarity
and certainty, it might seem odd to impute merit to a system that
valorizes “incompletely theorized rulings” that are both “narrow” and
“shallow.” However, there is scarcely too much agreement and
harmony in our contemporary, hostilely partisan world. Even if the
terms of certain rulings mean slightly different things to different
people, “shallowness” might make it easier for them to agree with
one another. I think that Cass Sunstein’s Burkean minimalism
plainly shows its derivation from the philosophy and wisdom of
Learned Hand through Gerald Gunther to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
if it is followed by the courts, it might herald an era of greater comity
in our nation.
VALEDICTORY: A LIFE WELL LIVED
In looking back on the remarkable life and career of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, one cannot fail to be impressed by her wisdom
and accomplishments. She was brilliant, diligent and remarkably
well-disciplined. Her appointment to the Supreme Court at the
relatively old age of sixty was a merit appointment, as her ninety-six
to three confirmation vote suggests. It is a tribute to her sagacity,
strategic skills and sense of timing that she was the litigator most
responsible for making lasting changes in women’s legal rights
during the 1970s. Unlike other revolutionary changes in the law in
223
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the twentieth century, the changes in the law that she helped bring
about have won universal acceptance. I think that this is due in part
to her commitment to interstitial development of the law, influenced
by her knowledge of common law and its history. She understood
and appreciated historical processes and how law evolves through the
interaction of legislatures, courts and the beliefs and culture of the
American people.
No stranger to tragedy, poverty, and setbacks, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg led a trailblazing life within a traditional framework. As a
young woman, she married the love of her life and had children. She
supported her husband when he fell ill in law school while she
continued her own studies and took care of their daughter. She was
lively, beautiful, and well-liked. The male legal community denied
her jobs that went to males, so she became a teacher. While she was
a law professor, she became an active litigator in the 1970s and won
landmark cases to further the civil rights of women. Along the way,
she was supported by men in her personal life who helped her to
achieve her goals. She remained true to her jurisprudential
philosophy and took advantage of every opportunity to help bring
about permanent improvements in women’s rights. Her brilliance,
her work ethic, and her strength of character eventually won for her a
position of power, acclaim and influence. She was a woman of her
time who became a legend. Tikkun olam. May her memory be a
blessing for all Americans!

